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DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WITHOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR STATE
ACTION
Dale Read, Jr.*
Many Americans believe that every four years they go to the polls
to vote for a presidential candidate and that the national popular vote
winner becomes the country's chief executive. In fact, they vote only
for electors who subsequently vote for the President and Vice Presi-
dent. This indirect election mechanism is the electoral college. The
present operation of the electoral college reflects both the mandate of
the Constitution and the historical evolution of the electoral system.
During the 200 years of America's existence no other part of our gov-
ernmental framework has been the subject of such continuous opposi-
tion-more than 500 constitutional amendments have been proposed
to remedy the perceived evils of its operation.1 Yet the prospects for
constitutional change remain remote. This article will suggest that this
focus on the constitutional amendment process for changing the elec-
toral college has been misdirected. The states, without federal action,
possess the capability of implementing the direct popular election of
the President. This article will examine the background of electoral
college reform and will propose a "National Vote Plan" to achieve
direct popular presidential election independently of the constitutional
amendment process.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE
REFORM
A. History of the Electoral College
The Constitution provides for the election of the President of the
United States by electors from each state "equal to the whole Number
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; B.A., 1968, Whitman College; J.D., 1971,
Duke University.
1. See N. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT-VOTE ALTERNATIVE 151 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
PEIRCE]. Only one such proposal has become law-the twelfth amendment which
was ratified in 1804.
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of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress ' 2 and chosen "in such Manner as the legislature [of
each state] may direct."'3 An examination of the electoral college4 sys-
tem, therefore, requires an understanding of the work of the Constitu-
tional Convention.
Although many proposals for choosing the President were con-
sidered at Philadelphia, only three generated much interest. 5 The
Convention failed to reach a consensus on the first--direct election by
the people-for a number of reasons: delegates feared that problems
of travel and communication would prevent the electorate from ade-
quately evaluating the candidates; representatives of small states
sought a greater voice in the selection of the President; the South
feared a loss of power because of the nonvoting slave population; and
many delegates desired to insulate the President from direct popular
process. 6 The second alternative, election by Congress, was rejected
by the Convention because the delegates feared that such an election
would be dominated by political intrigue and that the President would
be too subservient to the Congress that had chosen him. 7 The third
proposal, election by intermediate electors, was therefore chosen, not
because it was intrinsically attractive, but because it constituted an at-
tainable compromise. 8
Having reached this basic decision, the Convention needed to re-
solve crucial details to implement the intermediate electoral system.
The delegates sidestepped the most important detail, how the electors
should be selected, by leaving this decision to the state legislatures. A
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
3. Id.
4. The term "electoral college" is not used in the Constitution; it is a popular
label which has evolved since the Constitutional Convention. In fact, the term is a
misnomer because electors do not gather in one place: the Constitution provides
only that they "shall meet in their respective states." Id.
5. See generally PEIRCE, supra note 1. at 39-50; L. LONGLEY & A. BRAUN. THE
POLITICS OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM 22-28 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LONGLEY
& BRAUN]; Feerick, The Electoral College: Why It Was Created, 54 A.B.A.J. 250-52
(1968).
6. See PEIRCE, supra note I, at 41-50; LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 5. at 24:
Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It Ought To Be Abolished, 37 FOROHAM L. REV.
1, 6-7 (1968).
7. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 39-41; LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 5, at 24;
Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It Ought To Be Abolished, supra note 6. at 6.
8. Like the other proposals, the indirect election plan had been defeated in previous
votes during the Convention. In the end, however, it represented the program that
could be most readily "sold" to the Framers' constituents. See PEIRCE, supra note I,
at 43-50.
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second detail, deciding the number of electors for each state, was re-
solved near the end of the Convention without serious debate.9 A final
problem involved balancing the interests of the large and small states.
Because the Framers evidently felt that most state electors would vote
for candidates from their own states, they feared that although no one
would receive a majority of electoral votes, candidates from the larger
states would receive the greatest number. 10 The Convention resolved
the problem of state interests by requiring an absolute majority of the
electoral college for election. In the event that no candidate received a
majority, the House of Representatives would elect a President from
among the top five;"- because the delegates from each state were allo-
cated only one vote, this constituted a significant concession to the
small states.' 2
The Convention's scheme provided the framework of the electoral
system, but the states developed the modern electoral college. Two
factors influenced this development. First, the deliberately vague con-
stitutional mandate that each state legislature provide for the appoint-
ment of state electors made change possible. Second, the development
of organized political parties that selected a candidate and sought his
election made evolution of the system imperative.
The evolution of the present electoral college system consisted of
three distinct elements. First, electors became firmly bound by tradition
to vote for a particular candidate. This development, which resulted
from the growth of national political parties, was completed by the
election of 1800, at which time party loyalty was so strong that no
elector defected.' 3 The second element, which resulted from action by
the state legislatures, was the trend away from legislative and toward
9. In reporting the Convention discussion of the final indirect election proposal,
Madison does not record any debate on the allocation of electors. The delegates agreed
to the recommendation of the Committee of Eleven, a group chosen to draw up a
compromise plan. See J. MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 0F1787
WHICH FRAMED THE -CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 506-32
(G. Hunt & J. Scott ed. 1920). The final decisions on the electoral college were made
on September 6, 1787; on September 17, the Constitution was sent to the states for
ratification.
10. Id. See also Comment, State Power to Bind Presidential Electors, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 696, 697-98 (1965).
11. While Article II of the Constitution originally provided for election from
among the top five candidates, the twelfth amendment, ratified in 1804, reduced the
number to three.
12. See Feerick, The Electoral College-Why it Ought To Be Abolished, supra
note 6, at 10. See also PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 37.
13. See generally PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 65-71. See also note 62 infra.
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popular selection of electors. 14 This trend was important in making
the Presidency reflect the popular will. Finally, all state legislatures
provided for the election of a single slate of electors for an entire state,
replacing a system initially used in many states of choosing individual
electors by districts within a state. 15 These three changes occurred
within 50 years of the Constitutional Convention and transformed the
ill-defined system of the Framers into the present mechanism for elect-
ing the President.
B. Problems with the Electoral System
As it has evolved, the electoral college system represents a melange
of constitutional requirements, state laws, and political party prac-
tices. It is not surprising, therefore, that it has produced adverse ef-
fects. In order to understand the need for electoral reform it is neces-
sary to understand these problems. 16
14. See LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 5, at 30-31. The transition to popular elec-
tion was largely completed by the election of Jackson to his second term in 1832. For
a list of the various methods used by the states to choose electors in the early elections
see PEIRCE, supra note I, at 309-11.
15. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 77. This winner-take-all system was instituted to
enhance the individual state's impact on electoral voting. This change was also largely
complete by Jacksonian times. As a creation of state law, this approach can be modi-
fied by state law. In fact, Maine changed the winner-take-all system in 1969. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1181-A, 1184(1)(A) (Supp. 1975), providing that
one elector shall be chosen in each (of two) congressional districts, and that two
shall be chosen statewide. In 1966 Delaware challenged the winner-take-all system.
but its suit for an injunction was denied by the Supreme Court in a memorandum
decision. Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966).
16. The problems discussed in the text inhere in an indirect electoral system and
can be characterized as structural defects. There are two other electoral problems that
deserve mention, however. The first of these is the constitutionally-required procedure
for a contingent election in the House of Representatives in the event no candidate
receives a majority of electoral votes. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. The procedure has been
utilized on two occasions, in the elections of 1800 and 1824, and the results suggest
that political considerations, rather than merit or the popular will, become the de-
terminative factors for selecting the winner. See notes 17 & 62 infra. See also Rosen-
thal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14-16
(1968). Numerous proposals to implement direct popular election include plans to
change the contingent election procedure. The most frequently mentioned mechanism
is the runoff provision of the A.B.A. proposal that was passed by the House and intro-
duced in the Senate in 1969. This proposal would require a second election between
the two leading candidates if neither received 40% of the popular vote. See AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM. ELECTING THE PRES-
IDENT 8-I 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. REPORT] which concluded that 40%
of the electorate constitutes a sufficient popular mandate for a President. Much of the
criticism of the direct election approach has focused on the runoff procedure. See, e.g.,
A. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY 26-27 (1971); W. SAYRE & J. PARRIS, VOTING FOR
PRESIDENT 74-76 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SAYRE & PARRIS]; David, Reforming the
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The first and most obvious fault of any indirect electoral system is
that the candidate receiving a plurality vote can lose the determinative
electoral vote to a person receiving fewer popular votes. This has,
happened at least twice in our history17 and is a possibility in any
close election. When this occurs the popular will is thwarted and faith
in political institutions may be undermined.
Second, the electoral college distorts the voting power of each voter
in every election. This problem is two-fold: each state receives a min-
Presidential Nominating Process, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., 159, 161-64 (1962).
Indeed, this provision has been considered a primary reason why the direct vote pro-
posal has been stalled in Congress. See Eagleton, Direct Election vs. Vox Populi, 56
A.B.A.J. 543 (1970), pointing out that a runoff election could result in an undesirable
delay in the process, proliferate the number of candidates on the first ballot, and lead
to the election of a candidate who was not the first choice of the majority of voters.
Proponents of the A.B.A. proposal acknowledge these problems, but argue that the
danger of a President supported by less than 40% of the electorate mandates'use of
the runoff. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra, at 8-10. This author believes, however, that
this conclusion is erroneous and advocates election of the plurality winner regardless
of the percentage of the total vote received. Americans have come to realize that
Presidents will often have less than a majority of all votes cast; this has occurred in
15 of the 38 popular vote elections, including three of the last seven. See PEIRCE,
supra note I, at 304-08. Moreover, if voters realize that they have but one chance to
affect the outcome of an election they would be less likely to vote for a minor party
candidate in the hope of forcing a runoff. Thus, a single ballot should draw support
toward, rather than away from, centrist candidates. Finally, only one Presidential
election has produced a winner who received less than 40% of the vote; this was, in-
1860, when Lincoln, who was not on the ballot in 10 out of 33 states, won 39.8% of
the vote. These factors suggest that the fear of a President without a "popular man-
date" may be illusory, and that the dangers of a runoff procedure outweigh its ad-
vantages.
The second nonstructural problem is the possibility of a candidate dying before the
popular vote election, or between the election and the time when electors vote. Be-
cause the possibility of a candidate's death is present regardless of the prevailing
electoral mechanism, this problem is independent of the issue of electoral college
reform and will not be discussed in this article. For a discussion of the potential
problems see Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It Ought To Be Abolished, supra
note 6, at 23-24 and PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 134-36.
17. In 1876 Democrat Samuel Tilden won the popular vote, obtaining 50.9% of
the votes cast and more than a 250,000 vote plurality, but he was one vote short of
an electoral majority. Returns from three southern states were disputed, and each
party accused the other of wholesale vote fraud. Congress created a 15 member corrm-
mission (8 Republicans, 7 Democrats) to review the returns from each of these states.
By straight party voting, it found for each of the three Republican elector slates,
thereby electing Rutherford B. Hayes by one electoral vote. The election results of
1888 were more straightforward: Benjamin Harrison won' an outright electoral victory,
notwithstanding a popular plurality for incumbent Grover Cleveland. See generally
PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 86-93. In 1960 the Kennedy popular vote reflected votes
cast for unpledged Alabama Democratic Party. Subsequent computations suggest that.
appropriate distribution of those votes may have given Nixon a national plurality.
For a discussion of the problem and alternative computations see id. at 102-04;
LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 5, at 4-6; Kefauver, The Electoral College: Old Re-
forms Take on a New Look, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 188, 189-90 (1962).
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imum of three electors regardless of its population, 18 and each state
casts its electoral votes as a bloc. 19 While these two factors tend to
offset one another, on balance each large-state voter has a signifi-
cantly greater opportunity to affect the outcome of an election with
his or her single vote than does the small-state voter.20
Third, under the present system electors can defeat their constitu-
ents' expectations by voting for someone other than the candidate on
whose slate they were elected. Although few defections have occurred,
the possibility exists that in any election where the electoral vote is
close a small number of electors could personally decide which candi-
date would be President. 21 It is inconsistent with our system of repre-
sentative government to vest electors with such power, particularly
since they do not answer to the electorate and are not bound by stan-
dards in the exercise of their power.
Closely related to the defecting elector problem is the possibility of
independent electors, who may run with the express purpose of win-
ning sufficient votes to deny an electoral majority to either major
party candidate. These electors could cast decisive votes for the candi-
date who would make the most favorable concessions to their political
objectives.2 2 Such a bargained-for Presidency would be dangerous,
18. As a result of this requirement, Alaska gets approximately five times as many
electors per capita as does California. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 139.
19. California's electoral votes have 15 times the impact of those from Alaska.
Delaware, Nevada, North Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming or the District of Columbia,
each of which possess the minimum number of electors. See LONGLEY & BRAUN. supra
note 5, at 179-80 (giving electoral votes by state through 1980).
20. See Banzhaf, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Elec-
toral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 303 (1968). The author utilizes computer analysis to
examine the likelihood that a voter will cast the deciding vote in each state, as com-
pared to the likelihood that each state's slate of electors will cast the deciding electoral
votes. He concludes that the large-state voter generally has significantly more voting
power than the small-state voter. The author's basic mathematical technique was
relied upon by the New York Court of Appeals in invalidating the apportionment of
a county board of supervisors. See lannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244.
251, 229 N.E.2d 195, 198 (1967). The technique was also noted by the United States
Supreme Court in reviewing a Texas reapportionment plan. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S.
120, 125 (1967). For a critical examination of the Banzhaf methodology and his
conclusions see Sickels, The Power Index and the Electoral College: A Challenge to
Banzhafs Analysis, 14 VILL. L. REV. 92 (1968).
21. The possibility of such defection appears to be increasing. Electors have de-
fected in four of the last five elections. See J. BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELEC-
TION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 38-40 (1975).
See also PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 123-24.
22. This was the admitted purpose of some avowedly independent electors who
ran in 1960. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 106. It was also the real thrust of the
Wallace third-party campaign in 1968. See Bayh, Electing a President-The Case for
Direct Popular Election, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 127, 128-29 (1968).
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not only because of the spectre of a political deal, but also because of
the likelihood that the deal would be made with a group that is at the
edges of the political spectrum and not representative of most voters.
A fifth defect is the magnification of the impact of vote fraud or
counting error. In the 1960 election, for example, Kennedy carried
Illinois by fewer than 9,000 votes. A shift of less than 0.1 percent of
the total votes cast would have delivered Illinois to Nixon and brought
Kennedy within five votes of electoral college defeat. In such a situta-
tion, the defection of a few electors could have resulted in a President
elected by the House of Representatives.23 Under the present system,
therefore, a few thousand miscounted or fraudulently obtained votes,
while having only a minimal impact on the national popular vote even
in a close race such as that of 1960,24 can prove decisive by shifting
large blocs of electoral votes.
Lastly, the existing electoral college mechanism impairs the effec-
tiveness of interstate political coalitions. While a small intrastate
group may hold the balance of power in the election process of an
individual state, a group of similar size scattered among several states
cannot exercise the same influence.25
C. Proposals for Electoral College Reform
Because of the many serious defects and distortions attributable to
the electoral college, its reform is a recurring issue in American gov-
ernment. Although numerous proposals have been suggested, there are
only four basic plans for reform.26
23. Some analysts have calculated that, assuming no elector defections, the right
shift of 8971 votes in Illinois and Missouri would have thrown the 1960 election into
the House. Claims of vote fraud involving up to 100,000 votes in Chicago alone
underscore the narrowness of this margin. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 109. See also
LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 5, at 1-7. The problem of the Alabama vote count for
Kennedy in light of the unpledged elector slate casts a further cloud over the election.
See note 17 supra.
24. In an historical context, the 1960 popular vote was "close" with only approx-
imately 112,000 or 58,000 votes separating the two leading candidates. (The former
is the more commonly accepted count. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 307, for an ex-
planation of the latter, alternative count.) The popular vote was not so close, however,
that the small numbers of strategically-placed votes that could have changed the
electoral college outcome would have resulted in a new popular vote winner.
25. See Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It Ought To Be Abolished, supra
note 6, at 25.
26. See generally LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 5, at 42-73; PEIRCE, supra note 1,
at 151-204; SAYRE & PARRIS, supra note 16, at 69-134; Banzhaf, supra note 20, at
318-22; Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It Ought To Be Abolished, supra note 6
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1. The district plan
As it is generally proposed, the district plan would abolish the office
of elector and would automatically award one electoral vote to the
winner of each congressional district and two additional electoral
votes to the winner in each state.27 Although this would break up the
statewide winner-take-all system, it would retain winner-take-all in
smaller units. The distortions in the present system would be retained,
but their impact would be more localized. A new fault also would be
introduced into the political system: the possibility of Presidential ger-
rymandering. The drawing of district boundaries would affect not
only congressional elections, but the Presidential election as well, and
would give state legislatures a commanding role in the election pro-
cess.
2. The proportional plan
The proportional plan would retain the electoral college format,
but would automatically allocate to each candidate a share of the
state's total electoral vote based on his proportion of that state's pop-
ular vote.28 In so doing, the impact of the smaller states' higher per-
capita electoral votes would be maximized, and the relative voting
power of their citizens would be far greater than the relative voting
power of citizens of the large states under the present system.29
at 26-42; Kefauver, supra note 17, at 193-207; Comment, The Electoral College:
Proposed Changes, 21 Sw. L.J. 269, 276-83 (1967).
27. This format is essentially that proposed in the Mundt-Coudert plan of the late
1940's and 1950's. Numerous permutations have been suggested, some maintaining
the role of electors and some creating new districts for their election. On several
occasions during the early 19th century. district plans passed at least one house of
Congress. See generally A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 16, at 34, LONGLEY & BRAUN,
supra note 5, at 57-64; PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 152-64; SAYRE & PARRIS, supra
note 16, at 102-17.
28. Such a plan was first introduced in 1848 and subsequently has been proposed
on numerous occasions. The high water mark for the proportional plan occurred in
1950 when the Senate passed the Lodge-Gossett proposal by the required two-thirds
vote; the measure subsequently was defeated in the House. See generally A.B.A.
REPORT, supra note 16, at 34-35; LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 5, at 49-56; PEIRCE.
supra note 1, at 164-77; SAYRE & PARRIS, supra note 16, at 118-34.
29. See Banzhaf, supra note 20, at 325. Relative voting power of voters in the
most advantaged state vis-.-vis the least advantaged would be approximately 5 to I
under the proportional plan, but only 3 to I under the present system or the district
plan. See id. at 329-32 where the author tabulates relative voting power under each
of the proposals discussed herein.
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3. The automatic plan
The automatic plan would abolish the office of elector, but would
otherwise retain the present election mechanism by automatically
awarding a state's total electoral votes to its popular-vote winner.
Except for the possibility of elector defections,30 this plan would re-
tain the problems inherent in the present system.
4. Direct popular vote
Under the direct popular vote proposal, the popular-vote winner
automatically becomes President; the intermediate elector system is
abolished. Although each of the other plans would address some of
the faults of the present system, only direct popular vote eliminates all
of the inequities and distortions that arise from an indirect electoral
system. Only complete abolition of an indirect electoral system, more-
over, will eliminate both the possibility that a second-place finisher
could become President and the disparity in voting power between the
citizens of different states.31 The direct election system has not gone
without criticism, however. It has been rejected as a constitutional
amendment over 100 times.32 Moreover, some of the opposition argu-
ments raise fundamental questions about the nature of the American
political system and its underlying principles.
Opponents of the direct election of the President maintain that it
would derogate the fundamental system of federalism. As applied to
the debate on electoral college reform, federalism is the concept that
the states--as states-must retain some influence in the electoral
30. Like other reform plans, the automatic plan has been proposed in Congress
on numerous occasions dating from 1826. Despite its endorsement by President John-
son in 1965, it has continued to attract little support. See generally LONGLEY & BRAUN,
supra note 5, at 43-49; PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 177-81; SAYRE & PARRIS, supra
note 16, at 90-101.
31. This discussion is not intended to exhaustively analyze the voluminous debate
on the relative merits of the direct election vis-A-vis the 6xisting mechanism or, the
other proposals. Rather, its purpose is to establish the general efficacy of direct elec-
tion by suggesting its strengths and pointing to weaknesses in the arguments of its
opponents, and to propose an alternative mechanism for its implementation. For a
more thorough discussion of the viability of the direct election system vis-A-vis the
existing system compare PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 253-300; LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra
note 5, at 74-128; Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It Ought To Be Abolished,
supra note 6, at 11-26, with J. BEST, supra note 21, at 42-45; A. BICKEL, supra
note 16, at 21-29; SAYRE & PARRIS, supra note 16, at 69-89.
32. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 16, at 35.
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system. This consideration was important to the Framers, and they
sought some method to protect the small states. The evolution of polit-
ical parties and the winner-take-all system, however, had the oppo-
site effect, and buried small-state electoral power under an avalanche
of large-state electoral blocs. The real thrust of the federalism argu-
ment, therefore, is that any electoral college reform should return to
the Framers' original intention of protecting the small states by
adopting the district or the proportional plan; either of these proposals
would eliminate the present advantage enjoyed by the large states and
would restore relatively greater influence to the small states, which
receive at least three electoral votes regardless of population. 33 This
argument, however, does not recognize either the realities of the Con-
stitutional Convention or the subsequent evolution of the present elec-
toral college system, 34 and would replace one pattern of inequities
with another. A federalist electoral system should not be achieved at
the expense of grossly unequal voting power and occasional minority
Presidents.
Direct election opponents also maintain that the present system
should be retained because of the advantage it provides urban inter-
ests in the populous states.35 This reasoning, however, can be chal-
lenged both in theory and in practical effect. First, the theory that
"one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hos-
33. See Banzhaf, supra note 20, at 3 18-21.
34. The Convention did not consider the distribution of electoral votes to be a sig-
nificant compromise between large and small states. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 36.
Rather the Framers' solution to the large versus small states conflict, in the electoral
college context, was the electoral majority and contingent election mechanism. See
notes 10 & II and accompanying text supra. Therefore, it is fallacious to argue that
the existing plan favoring large-state voters should be replaced by one favoring small-
state voters on the basis of an imputed but nonexistent intent to provide the small
states with extra voting power. Moreover, this argument ignores two fundamental
realities. First, small states do not need such special protection inasmuch as they have
not been victimized by the large states in the 200 years of the country's history. See
PIERCE. supra note 1, at 262, where the author labels the large state versus small
state argument the "Great Irrelevancy." Second, all states long ago delegated to their
citizens the right to vote for the President; as states, they have not exercised direct
electoral influence for 150 years.
35. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 16, at 12-14; SAYRE & PARRIS, supra note 16,
at 71-73. A derivative argument is that the direct election of the President would
adversely affect the political power of ethnic groups and minorities because they tend
to live in urban areas. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 12-13; Sindler, Presiden-
tial Election Methods and Urban-Ethnic Interests, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 213
(1962). This position is subject to the same theoretical and practical criticisms as the
broader urban interests argument discussed herein.
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tile to our standards for popular representative government. '36 Sec-
ond, while individual populous states undeniably are favored by the
existing system, this does not mean that a constituency of large states
or urban interests actually exists. In fact, the diversity of interests
among states with large blocs of electoral votes frequently results in
their voting for different candidates, thereby cancelling out the effects
of their votes rather than accumulating them.
The common thrusts of the urban-interest and federalism argu-
ments are that certain states deserve greater influence in our political
system because of their size, and that states of similar size share over-
riding common interests. However, it is people, not states, who have
interests, and the relative population of the state in which a person
lives does not determine the nature of his interests as much as do eco-
nomic, social, and political considerations. Therefore, to give a group
of states an electoral advantage is to give their individual voters spe-
cial preference based upon nothing more than the accident of the
voter's residence. Such a preference cannot be justified. Moreover,
while urban and rural areas have certain identifiable interests, the con-
clusion that large or small states will therefore vote as a bloc largely
ignores the fact that local realities, as well as other demographic and
social characteristics, make the states different.
36. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 290 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
While MacDougall involved the narrow question of state restrictions on the formation
of new political parties, the issue addressed by Justice Douglas recurs in discussions
of the electoral college. Indeed, his belief underlies the position of direct election ad-
vocates. See, e.g., A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 16, at 7; PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 296-98;
Bayh, supra note 22, at 136-37. In the years since MacDougall, the reapportionment
decisions have firmly established the tenet of "one person, one vote" 'as a fundamental
principle of American government. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wes-
berry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). Although
these decisions cannot be directly applied to the electoral college because of its valida-
tion in the Constitution, they do underscore its anomalous position. The language of
Chief Justice Warren, speaking in the context of legislative reapportionment, in
Reynolds v. Sims makes the disparity clear:
To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a cit-
izen. The fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate reason for
overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote. [T] he weight of a'citizen's vote
cannot be made to depend on where he lives .... A citizen, a qualified voter, is
no more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm. This is the
clear and strong command of our Constitution's Equal Piotection Clause.This
is an essential part of the concept of a government of laws and not men. This is
at the heart of Lincoln's vision of "government of the people, by the people,
[and] for the people."
377 U.S. at 567-68.
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The third major argument against direct election of the President is
that it would weaken the two-party system.37 This concern is legiti-
mate but over-emphasizes the importance of the electoral college in
the development of the American political party system. As one com-
mentator has pointed out, critics of direct popular vote rarely provide
a detailed explanation of how the two-party system would be weak-
ened by its adoption. 38 On the other hand, political scientists and
commentators have detailed several reasons for the two-party system
and the electoral college is not one of them.39 Abolishing the electoral
college would not affect these reasons, thus indicating that the two-
party system would endure.
II. THE NATIONAL VOTE PLAN
A. A New Proposal for Electoral College Reform
The historical failure of electoral reform efforts indicates that a
fresh approach is required. Since the early 1800's when the present
37. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 16, at 21-29; SAYRE & PARRIS, supra note 16,
at 73-82.
38. Bayh. supra note 22, at 136. During their 1966-67 study, the A.B.A. Com-
mission on Electoral College Reform found six generally cited reasons for the exis-
tence of two-party politics in the United States:
1. the persistence of initial form
2. the election of officials from single-member districts by plurality votes
3. the normal presence of a central consensus on national goals
4. a cultural homogeneity
5. a political maturity
6. a general tendency toward dualism
LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 5, at 88. The premise that the two-party system would
continue in the absence of the electoral college underlies the A.B.A. proposal. See
A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 16, at 5.
39. Among these reasons are the election laws, campaign practices, and social
patterns that make it difficult for minor parties to become established, and the high
cost of campaigning which makes it difficult for an emerging group to become an ef-
fective political force. Of greater significance is the fact that American political offices
(including the Presidency) cannot be parcelled out among minor parties in a coalition
cabinet, and the fact that. in the United States. the single-member district is used. in
which only the top vote-getter is elected, rather than the "at-large" system in which a
minor party can win political representation by placing fourth or fifth in the election.
See generally V.O. KEY. JR. POLITICS. PARTIES & PRESSURE GROUPS 205-10 (5th ed.
1964); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 65-84 (1960).
Analogy to local political realities suggests that the absence of the electoral college
may have a beneficial effect on the two-party system. This author's observations in-
dicate that fewer third party campaigns occur in state and local elections where there
is a direct vote than in Presidential campaigns where there is not; thus, the abolition
of the electoral college may actually strengthen the two-party system.
332
Electoral College
system took shape, the proponents of change have attempted to cor-
rect its recognized shortcomings with an endless stream of constitu-
tional amendments. Each attempt has failed, and the prospects for
success through constitutional amendment remain uncertain at best.
This exclusive reliance on constitutional electoral reform has been
misplaced. As explained above, out present electoral system is as
much the product of state law as of constitutional directive. In light of
this historical evolution, it is as appropriate to institute reform by
changing state practices as it is to do so by amending the Constitu-
tion's language.
The states possess the power to institute direct popular vote and
they can do so more readily than the Constitution can be amended.
Reform can be accomplished if the states change their election laws to
require electors to support the national popular-vote winner, rather
than the individual state winners. In effect, electors of both parties
would pledge to vote for the candidate receiving the national plu-
rality. This National Vote Plan would eliminate the winner-take-all
system and its resulting inequities just as effectively as would a consti-
tutional amendment implementing direct popular vote. Technically,
an indirect electoral system would remain, but the faults presently at-
tributable to such a system would be substantially eliminated, because
the electors would vote for the national winner. Although a Presiden-
tial candidate would still have to win an electoral college majority, he
would receive the requisite electoral votes only by winning a nation-
wide popular mandate. Even if all states did not adopt the National
Vote Plan, the action of a few, as will be demonstrated, could effec-
tively implement the proposal. Direct popular vote would ibecome a
reality, and it would result from state efforts rather than constitutional
change.40
B. Problems with the National Vote Plan
The suggestion that the states should become the vehicle for imple-
40. This same result could be accomplished without state 'legislative action: indi-
vidual electors could decide to defect from their candidate and vote for the national
winner or a defeated candidate could release his electors, asking them to vote for, the
victor. If either of these actions became tradition, de facto direct election would re-
sult. Because neither of these possibilities is likely to occur, however, the focus here
is exclusively on state legislative enactment.
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menting direct popular vote departs radically from current thinking
on electoral reform and raises several problems that must be fully ex-
plored.
1. Viability of state action
The National Vote Plan, which seeks to implement electoral reform
by means of state action, presents several issues concerning the basic
role of the states in the electoral system. The first of these issues is
whether states have the power to act in this area. It is clear that they
do. State legislatures possess very broad power under the Constitution
to appoint electors; federal law merely sets the time for such appoint-
ment and establishes a vote count mechanism.41 In fact, the two pri-
mary ingredients of the present electoral system-popular election of
the electors and choice of a statewide ticket-are wholly creations of
state law, subject to change at any time by the states. The Supreme
Court has confirmed this view. In 1892 when Michigan reverted to a
district plan, the Court, in McPherson v. Blacker,42 upheld the legisla-
tion. After an extensive review of the Constitutional Convention and
the early elections, a unanimous Court found that throughout our his-
tory "the practical construction of the clause [Art. II, § 1, cl. 2] has
conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the
appointment of electors."'43 The Court concluded: 44
The question before us is not one of policy but of power. . . .The
prescription of the written law cannot be overthrown because the
States have latterly exercised in a particular way a power which they
might have exercised in some other way. The construction to which we
have referred has prevailed too long and been too uniform to justify us
in interpreting the language of the Constitution as conveying any other
meaning than that heretofore ascribed, and it must be treated as deci-
sive.
The Court's decision in McPherson makes possible the consideration
of other closely related issues.
One such issue is whether states can appoint electors based upon
41. 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-18(1970).
42. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
43. Id. at 35.
44. Id. at 35-36.
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events occurring outside the state, for example, the nationwide pop-
ular vote count. Despite an absence of legal precedent, historical ex-
amples suggest that the power of the states, as recognized by the Court
in McPherson, should be sufficient to permit this. On a number of
occasions electors have made contingent pledges of their votes. In
1824 North Carolina backers of candidates Jackson and Adams,
fearing defeat by Crawford, combined in support of a single anti-
Crawford slate pledged to vote for the candidate most likely to win.45
Similarly, South Dakota's 1912 Progressive slate, which was pledged
to Roosevelt, indicated that it would vote for Taft if he was in a better
position nationally to defeat Wilson.46 More recently, George Wal-
lace's 1968 electors promised by notarized oath to vote for Wallace
"or whomsoever he may direct. '47 Although partisan politics, and not
the desire to implement electoral reform, motivated such actions, they
do indicate that electors may wait until the national vote has been
tabulated before deciding how to cast their ballots.
Assuming that states possess the requisite power to implement the
National Vote Plan, the advisability of such action must be considered.
For 32 states and the District of Columbia, the answer is reasonably
clear. By adopting the National Vote Plan they can achieve direct
election of the President and thereby eliminate their voters' present
disadvantages. 48 All states, moreover, share an interest in removing an
antiquated barrier between the popular will and the Presidency, thus
"assuring every citizen an equal opportunity to participate in the elec-
tion of a man who will serve as our highest national officer and as a
symbol and spokesman equally for all Americans." 49
45. See L. WILMERDING, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 181 (1958).
46. Id.
47. See Bayh, supra note 22, at 128.
48. Professor Banzhafs study concluded that the following 18 states possess
greater than average voting power under the electoral college system: Alaska, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
and Wisconsin. The relative voting power of the remaining states is less than it would
be under a system of direct popular election. See Banzhaf, supra note 20, at 329.
According to the 1960 census relied upon by Banzhaf, seventeen of these states were
the nation's most populous states, and possessed the 17 largest electoral blocs. Alaska,
the least populous state, appears on the list because it has so few voters that it enjoys
a disproportionately large per capita allocation of electoral votes.
49. See Banzhaf, supra note 20, at 328. The 18 states with greater than average
relative voting power would sacrifice some of that strength if direct 'presidential elec-
tion were implemented. This fact, however, should not lead to the conclusion that
their legislatures will necessarily oppose the National Vote Plan. Concerned legislators
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An additional issue inherent in using state efforts to achieve this
type of electoral reform is whether the plan will work if not all states
act. The National Vote Plan can successfully implement the popular
election of the President even if some states do not adopt it. For elec-
toral purposes, the adopting states would constitute one large state
whose votes would be cast for a single candidate. Clearly, if their elec-
toral votes equalled one-half of the total, a candidate could be elected
only by winning a popular victory, and direct election of the President
would be a reality. The plan can work even if fewer than one-half of
the electoral votes are committed to the national winner, because the
winner will undoubtedly receive electoral votes from states that retain
the existing system. Indeed, states that hold 20-25 percent of the total
electoral college votes (108-135 electoral votes) can effectively imple-
ment the system. 50 Even if the first states adopting the National Vote
Plan had too few electoral votes to guarantee the popular election of
the President, their action would reduce the distortions inherent in the
present system by shifting campaign strategies from a state-by-state to
a nationwide focus. This shift in focus would be sufficient reason for
individual states to begin adopting the National Vote Plan.
2. Independent and defecting electors
Because the National Vote Plan retains individual electors, it also
retains possibilities of independent elector slates bargaining for the
Presidency and of individual elector defections. These problems, how-
ever, would be of less significance under the plan than under the present
system, and could be eliminated by state legislation irrevocably
binding the electors.
in such states could conclude that the national disadvantages of the electoral college
outweigh the advantages of greater local power in presidential elections. The in-
creasingly national orientation of the country's population and the popularity of the
direct election approach as reflected in the Gallup Polls should reinforce the pre-
disposition of such legislators. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 189-90, citing a 1966
Gallup Poll indicating that 63% of those polled favored abolition of the electoral
college. See also A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 16, at 7, citing a poll of state legislators
reflecting a 59% preference for the direct popular vote. Additionally, once other
states have adopted the plan, large states might follow suit to avoid the stigma of
parochialism.
50. Assume that the National Vote Plan existed in states representing 20% of the
total electoral votes to be cast. These states, therefore, would cast approximately 108
electoral votes for the popular winner. In order to win the election, the national loser
must carry states with 63% of the remaining electoral votes. The possibility of a
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As a practical matter, the likelihood of independent elector slates
and defecting electors would be lessened under the National Vote
Plan. First, if a sufficient number of states enacted the plan to ensure
the election of the popular-vote winner, an independent slate would be
deprived of its special bargaining power and could not affect the out-
come of a Presidential election. In such a situation voters may be de-
terred from casting futile ballots.51 Similarly, if enough states imple-
mented the plan, the possibility that enough electors would defect to
affect the election would be virtually eliminated.
Any chance of elector defection can be solved by legally binding
the electors to vote for the national winner. While the power of the
states to bind electors has not been passed upon by the Supreme
Court,52 convincing arguments can be made that they possess the req-
uisite power. The central question in making this determination is
whether the Constitution mandates elector independence.
Two arguments underlie the position that, under the Constitution,
electors must be independent. First, the language of Alexander Ham-
ilton in explaining the merits of an electoral college in The Federalist
contemplates such independence:53
[T] he immediate election should be made by men most capable of
analyzing qualities adapted to the station and acting under circum-
stances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all
the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their
choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens
from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information
and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation.
Hamilton's view suggests that state power was restricted to the ap-
pointment of electors and not the control of their votes. The second
candidate receiving less than a plurality of popular votes while winning such a sub-
stantial number of electoral votes is remote.
51. The extent to which this deterrence would actually affect voter behavior is
unknown. Logically, an independent slate in such circumstances should receive no
more votes than a true minor party receives in present elections.
52. In Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230 (1952), the Supreme Court expressly re-
served judgment on the issue. See text accompanying note 66 infra.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Mentor ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). Of the
authors of THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, only Hamilton enthusiastically endorsed the
electoral college system, remarking that "if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at
least excellent." Id. at 411-12. Many of the commentators on the electoral college
point to Hamilton's language in concluding that the Framers contemplated that elec-
tors cannot be bound. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 17; Feerick, The Electoral
College-Why it Ought To Be Abolished, supra note 6, at 9.
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argument supporting the independence of electors focuses upon the
Constitution's requirement that they "vote by ballot."54 This language
implies a secret vote by individuals capable of making a choice, and
has been so interpreted by at least one Supreme Court Justice.55
Although these arguments are cogent, some commentators have
concluded that they are not convincing. 56 A number of factors support
the contrary conclusion that states constitutionally can bind their elec-
tors. The appointment power, delegated by the Constitution to the
states, is broad and unqualified 57 and has been so construed by the
Supreme Court.5 8 Although the Court has superimposed constitutional
protections where the state chooses to appoint its electors by popular
election,5 9 state power to appoint can be deemed to encompass the
capacity to bind its electors to vote in accordance with the popular
will.
The early history of the country also suggests that the Framers did
not intend the President to be chosen by independent electors. During
the ratification debates, several of the Framers, arguing for various
processes to choose electors, strongly implied that those who selected
54. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
55. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 232 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice
Jackson, in arguing that state law is limited to the appointment of electors, stated:
-[N]o state law could control the elector in performance of his federal duty, any
more than it could a United States Senator who also is chosen by, and represents.
the State." Id.
56. See, e.g., L. WILMERDING, supra note 45, at 21; Kirby, Limitations oft the
Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
495 (1962); Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 799 (1961); Comment, supra note 10, at 696.
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. I.
58. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1892).
59. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892). in which the Court held that
while a state need not select its electors by popular vote its choice to do so results in
the attachment of fourteenth amendment protections. In McPherson the Court cited
its decision in In re Green. 134 U.S. 377 (1890). in which Justice Gray stated that
state power over Presidential elections is "unaffected by anything in the Constitution
and laws of the United States ...." Id. at 380 (dictum). Clearly, such a statement is
overbroad in light of the provisions of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and nineteenth amend-
ments which provide Congress power to enact enforcing legislation. Moreover, Con-
gress without opposition has legislated concerning the manner of certifying elector
appointments, transmission of credentials, filling vacancies, resolving contests and
other administrative details. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1970). See also Ex parte Yar-
brough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), in which the Court sustained legislation punishing
conspiracy to prevent citizens from lending aid to electors, and Burroughs & Cannon
v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), in which the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
was applied to electors. Yet no exercise of congressional power has attempted to
usurp the state appointment mechanism and efforts to bind electors. See generally
Kirby, supra note 56.
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the electors would select the President.60 Following ratification, the
issues of elector independence quickly disappeared. By the first con-
tested election in 1796, when Washington declined to run for a third
term, the emerging political parties had been largely successful in se-
curing the appointment of electors who would vote for their party's
candidate. 61 Four years later not one elector voted against his party's
candidate. 62 Significantly, in the constitutional crisis following the Jef-
ferson-Burr tie in that election, reform efforts were directed at insti-
tuting separate electoral ballots for President and Vice President, not
at ensuring elector independence. These events, which occurred within
a few years of the ratification of the Constitution and within the life-
times of many of the Framers, add credence to the conclusion that
elector independence is not a constitutional requirement.
Legislative and judicial authority also support the proposition that
state power to appoint electors includes the power to bind them.
Numerous states have enacted statutes purporting to bind their elec-
tors to vote for the statewide popular-vote winner. 63 Indeed, Congress
60. A number of statements are particularly revealing. For example, Madison
stated: "Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United
States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his ap-
pointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it." THE FED-
ERALIST No. 45, at 291 (Mentor ed. 1961). C.C. Pinckney of South Carolina argued
that the President should be popularly chosen "through the medium of electors
chosen particularly for that purpose." 4 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 304 (2d ed.
1937). While such statements do not directly repudiate Hamilton's position, they do
suggest that many Framers visualized a circumscribed independence for electors.
Moreover it has been suggested that Hamilton's views may have reflected his personal
aspirations. See Kirby, supra note 56, at 507.
61. See generally PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 62-65.
62. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 65-71. This lack of defection created one of the
great crises of early American political history. Since the Constitution origiially pro-
vided that each elector should vote for two candidates, the Republican slate of Jeffer-
son and Burr-receiving the total loyalty of their electors-tied for President in the
election of 1800. Burr, presumably the vice presidential candidate, took advantage of
the tie to seek the presidency. After 36 ballots the House of Representatives ultimately
elected Jefferson. The twelfth amendment resolved this problem by providing inter "alia
that electors vote separately for President and Vice President, rather than casting
two undifferentiated votes.
63. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.30.040, -.090 (1971); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 25105
(West 1961); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-17-101(5) (1973); CON14. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-176 (1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 10-102, -109 (1976). The most inter-
esting such provision is that of Oklahoma, which imposes a $1,000 fine for defection
and was enacted following the defection of one of the state's Republican electors in
1960. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 125. In addition, the short ballot nowv in general
use carries an implied pledge that the electors will vote for the named candidate. See
Kirby, supra note 56, at 507-08; Comment, supra note 10, at 699. Indeed, a New
York court has held that the long standing practice of voting for the state winner
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itself has passed such legislation for the District of Columbia. 64 Al-
though the Supreme Court has not adjudicated the constitutionality of
these provisions, the judiciary has deferred to state election proce-
dures. State courts have recognized the broad power of the political
parties to discharge elector nominees for threatened defection prior to
the election. 65 The Supreme Court in Ray v. Blair,66 although re-
serving the issue of elector independence following election, neverthe-
less upheld a political party requirement that electors pledge to vote
for the party nominee as a prerequisite to appointment. Such deci-
sions, together with longstanding legislation, provide a substantial
foundation for the argument that binding electors is constitutionally
permissible.
The enforceability of a law binding electors poses a separate and
troublesome question. If an elector announces an intention to defect, a
suit to prevent his action may constitute a nonjusticiable political
question.67 Even if the suit is justiciable, available remedies cannot
preclude defection or change the vote once cast.6 8 Similarly, once the
vote is cast, no effective mechanism exists either to prevent Congress
from counting it or to recast the ballot even if it is not counted.69
ripened into a legal duty which bound the elector and which could be enforced
against him by mandamus. Thomas v. Cohen, 146 Misc. 836. 841-42. 262 N.Y.S.
320, 326 (Sup. Ct. 1933). But see Breidenthal v. Edwards, 57 Kan. 332. 46 P. 469
(1896); State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 150 Ohio St. 127, 80 N.E.2d 899 (1948).
64. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1108(g) (1973).
65. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nebraska Republican Central Comm. v. Wait, 92 Neb.
313, 138 N.W. 159 (1912) (announced intent to defect constituted breach of an
implied pledge to vote for the party's candidate and allowed forfeiture of elector's
office); Browne v. Martin, 19 So. 2d 421 (La. Ct. App. 1944) (state party can rescind
nomination of elector at its discretion absent fraud or violation of state statute);
Seay v. Latham, 143 Tex. 1, 182 S.W.2d 251 (1944) (party can remove elector
nominee prior to certification for ballot).
66. 343 U.S. 214(1952).
67. See Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 27-30. But see Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969), in which the Court found the House of Representatives' exclusion
of Adam Clayton Powell justiciable notwithstanding the constitutional mandate of
Article 1, § 5 that eachHouse of Congress shall be the judge of the qualifications of
its members.
68. See Kirby, supra note 56, at 509.
69. Under federal election law, the governor of each state certifies its electors and
forwards the certificate to the Administrator of General Services who thereafter trans-
mits the certificates of all states to the Congress on the date prescribed for counting
the ballots. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1970). Controversies as to the appointment of electors are
to be determined by the states prior to certification. Id. § 5. Congress is empowered
officially to count the certified electors' ballots and to reject votes not "regularly given."
Id. § 15. The only statutory mechanism to challenge an electoral vote in Congress
requires a written objection to counting the vote, signed by at least one Representative
and one Senator. Such a challenge has been made only once, in the case of a defecting
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Though yet untested, a procedure can be implemented whereby elec-
tor fidelity can be assured even when electors do not announce in
advance their intention to defect. This can be accomplished by ap-
pointing electors subject to the condition that they properly perform
their duties. If those duties included a pledge to vote for the national
winner, and an elector failed to vote as mandated by the pledge, then
he would be in default in the performance of those duties, and his
appointment would be vacated automatically.70 The vacancy would
be filled immediately pursuant to state law.7 1 This procedure probably
would be challenged on the basis that the Constitution's "vote by bal-
lot" language compels a secret process, but the fact that electors in
many states now vote openly militates against such an interpreta-
tion.72 Even if secrecy were required, state procedures could declare
that all electors forfeit their positions in the presence of a single defec-
North Carolina elector in 1968. Congress, however, refused to sustain the challenge
and counted the electoral vote. In so doing, it indicated a reticence to invalidate
electors' votes once they have been certified by the state, although it is perhaps sig-
nificant that North Carolina had no statute binding electors to vote for a particular
candidate. See 115 CONG. REc. 146-70, 197-247 (1969). In light of this uncertain
precedent the meaning of "regularly giyen," and the practicality of any congressional
challenge to a "miscast" electora vote remain unclear. See Comment,
The Problem of the Faithless Elector, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 254 (1969). The possibility
of an action by a voter against Congress for an injunction or mandamus also exists,
but the courts would be likely to find the case nonjusticiable. See Rosenthal, supra
note 16, at 31. But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
70. Having suggested such a conditional vote mechanism, Kirby summarily con-
cludes that the best solution would be a federal constitutional amendment implement-
ing the automatic system. See Kirby, supra note 56, at 509.
71. Congress has expressly authorized the states to fill vacancies that may arise in
their elector slates. 3 U.S.C. § 3 (1970). Pursuant to this provision, most states now
have statutes authorizing the remaining electors to fill such vacancies. See, e.g., WASH.
REv. CODE § 29.71.040 (1975) (electors present fill vacancy by viva voce and plurality
of votes). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 7331-32 (1975) (General Assembly
fills vacancy by majority of votes); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 21-1 (Supp. 1975)
(state committee of the political party or group fills vacancy and certifies it to the
State Board of Elections); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 138 (1971) (electors
present fill vacancy by choosing from among citizens of the Commonwealth); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 33, §-20-3 (1971) (electors present fill any vacancy at first meeting
after election); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 19:1321 (Supp. 1975) (vacancy filled by any com-
mittee to which power may be delegated, otherwise by state committee of the political
party); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3193 (1963) (electors present fill vacancy by viva
voce); TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 11.05 (1967) (qualified electors present fill vacancy
by majority of votes). See generally PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 128.
72. The longstanding practice has been to vote openly. Electors in various states
vote by signed ballot, by oral announcement only, or by unsigned ballot accompanied
by a public announcement of how each voted. Open voting by electors lends support
to the theory that "vote by ballot" does not require secret voting. See Smiley v. Holm,
285 U.S. 355, 369 (1932) (customary official action can help interpret the true
meaning of legal phrases).
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tive ballot. Their votes would be invalidated, and a new elector slate
would be selected to vote for the prescribed candidate. Such a com-
promise would both preserve any requirement of secrecy of the indi-
vidual electoral ballot and eliminate elector defection.
3. Lack of a national ballot
Although the Presidency is a national office, state law determines
voting procedures. Individual states thus determine the qualifications
of candidates for their own ballots. 73 While this would not affect the
basic operation of the National Vote Plan, it does present practical
difficulties that arguably undermine the plan's merits. Under the Na-
tional Vote Plan, voters of some states could be denied a full choice in
the presidential election, absent congressional action implementing
uniform national prerequisites for ballot qualification.74 State ballot
requirements could preclude the expression of voters' preferences in
two types of situations. First, if the candidate of a new party did not
meet a state's requirements he would be excluded from its ballot.
75
Second, if the local state party supported someone other than the par-
ty's national nominee it would preempt the official ballot position.
76
73. This problem could be solved, of course, by a "National Ballot Act," estab-
lishing uniform ballot access rules for Presidential candidates. Most proposals for a
direct vote amendment include a clause authorizing Congress to pass such an act.
See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 16, at 11-12. However, it would appear that Congress
possesses such authority even in the absence of specific constitutional language. This
authority could be premised on any of several clauses in the Constitution (see the
opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S. 112. 124 n.7 (1970).
upholding federal legislation granting the 18 year old vote), but would perhaps be
more logically premised as a legislative implementation of the holding in Williams v.
Rhodes. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). Congress. after appropriate legislative findings that
Williams left uncertain the precise limits of permissible ballot access requirements.
could, in the interest of orderly campaigns for the presidency, establish those precise
limits within the principles set forth in Williams. See notes 77-81 and accompanying
text infra.
74. The American Bar Association in its direct election constitutional amendment
proposal, incorporated a recommendation that Congress specifically be authorized to
deal with exclusions of national candidates from state ballots. See A.B.A. REPORT.
supra note 16, at 12.
75. This was the problem faced by George Wallace in 1968 and which gave rise
to Williams v. Rhodes. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). In Williams, the challenged Ohio pro-
vision required petitions signed by 15% of the electorate (based on the number of
votes cast in the preceeding gubernatorial election) in order for a new party to be
listed on the presidential ballot. Id. at 24-25. Even at the time of Williams most
states required petitions signed by less than 1% of the electorate. Id. at 47 n.10
(Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
76. This has occurred a number of times in American history. In 1860 Lincoln's
name did not appear on the ballot in ten of the thirty-three states. In 1912 California's
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Both these problems stem from state election laws that allow the two
major parties to qualify automatically for the ballot, while requiring
new parties or different candidates to meet other prerequisites.
The problem faced by minor-party candidates has been essentially
eliminated by Williams v. Rhodes,77 in which the Supreme Court
struck down Ohio election law limitations that prevented George Wal-
lace from obtaining a place on the state's 1968 ballot. Although the
Court recognized that Ohio possessed valid interests in promoting a
two-party system, ensuring that new parties have broad popular sup-
port and adequate organizations, and having majority winners, it held
that these interests did not amount to a "compelling state interest" that
would sustain its restrictive election laws.78 Because less restrictive
alternatives existed, the Court held that Ohio's laws violated equal
protection guarantees as well as "the right of individuals to associate
for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified vot-
ers, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effec-
tively."'79 By implication, the Court suggested that a state could not
use its election laws to keep a party off the state's ballot-if it demon-
strated more than de minimis public support.
The Williams decision can also be applied to the problem of the
major-party candidate preempted from the state ballot. Although the
Court did not address this issue, its language can be applied to the
problem: 80
[S] ince the identity of the likely major party nominees may not be
known until shortly before the election, [the] disaffected 'group' will
rarely if ever be a cohesive or identifiable group until a few months"
before the election. Thus, Ohio's burdensome procedures. . . operate
to prevent such a group from ever getting on the ballot and the Ohio
system thus denies the 'disaffected' not only a choice of leadership but
a choice on the issues as well.
This reasoning would apply where a state party decided to support an
independent candidate and thus deprive the national nominee of a
Republican electors were pledged to Roosevelt, the Progressive Party candidate.
Finally, in 1948 and in 1964 the Alabama electorate could not'vote for te national
Democratic Party nominees because the state party had appropriated the
, 
electoral
slate.'See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 137.
77. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). '
78. Id. at 31.
79. Id. at 30.
80. Id. at 33.
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position on the ballot. Under the Williams rationale, backers of the
major-party candidate in that state could obtain ballot listing by satis-
fying state requirements for an independent party. If such require-
ments were overly restrictive, they could seek relief in federal court to
preserve their "choice on the issues."
The Williams decision, therefore, reduces the possibility that a na-
tional candidate will be deprived of a ballot position in a state because
of its election requirements. Even if some possibility remains,81 it
should not undermine the adoption of the National Vote Plan. Failure
to adopt the plan for fear that one state might succeed in keeping a
legitimate national candidate off the ballot would encourage obstruc-
tionist tendencies and would allow that state to decide for all states
whether they wanted a popularly elected President. More importantly,
future situations that might not be covered by Williams must be bal-
anced against the existing system's distortions. The latter clearly out-
weigh the former.
4. Counting the votes
Because the National Vote Plan focuses on the popular winner, an
official nationwide vote count assumes added importance. This prob-
lem, unlike that of getting candidates on the ballot, necessitates a leg-
islative solution. There are three possible ways to determine the na-
tional winner: utilization of the present vote count system, passage of
federal legislation, or adoption of new procedures at the state level.
By utilizing the existing vote count system, each state could compile
national totals from all states' official returns. 82 Such an approach
would lack adequate provision for dealing with close elections, how-
ever. The problems of analyzing the returns and determining a winner
81. In the companion case to Williams, the Court held that the Socialist Labor
Party, which had made little effort to comply with Ohio law and was late in seeking
judicial relief, was not entitled to ballot listing because of the disruptive effect on the
election process that would result. Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34-35
(1968). Thus, these decisions did not provide third parties with a carte blanche to
gain access to state ballots exclusively at their discretion.
82. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1970) provides that each state's executive submit by registered
mail to the Administrator of General Services a certificate indicating the electors se-
lected and the number of votes cast for each. Such certificates must be preserved for
one year and made part of the public record. Thus, each state adopting the National
Vote Plan could authorize an official to compile the submitted data and then to of-
ficially notify its electors of the national popular vote winner.
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in a close election require a more systematic approach to the vote
count issue than merely compiling national totals.
The best solution would be passage of a National Popular Vote
Count Act by Congress. Such an Act should contain provisions for
officially compiling and disseminating the national popular vote re-
sults, determining the necessity of a recount, and conducting a re-
count. Even if Congress does not enact such a law, the states could
adopt the National Vote Plan and incorporate provisions for dealing
with close elections. Although uniform federal legislation is prefera-
ble, the rarity of elections requiring recounts and the increasing accu-
racy of existing vote counting procedures suggest that a state-imple-
mented system would also be viable.8 3 Problems would still arise in
two circumstances. In the first, one state's election results might not be
final by the time the electors meet.84 This would present no difficulty
unless the national election was close. In the absence of such a close
race, the electors in states under the National Vote Plan could be in-
structed to vote for the national winner even though the results of one
or more states were not final. Close national results pose a more se-
rious difficulty, however. Incorporating parameters for vote totals into
the state legislation adopting the National Vote Plan would mitigate
but not solve this problem. Such legislation would define a conclusive
margin of victory and declare a winner if the votes for a candidate
exceeded the requisite margin.85 When this occurred, state officers
would so inform the appropriate slate of electors.
83. Technological advances in ballot counting and modem voting equipment re-
duce the chances of voting irregularity and correspondingly increase the accuracy of
the vote totals. This further reduces the statistically small possibility of a recount in a
presidential election. See PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 284-89. It is significant to note that
the A.B.A. proposal recommends continued utilization of state election procedures,
with reserve power vested in Congress to make and alter voting regulations. See
A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 16, at 11-12.
84. Electors meet and cast their votes on the first Monday after the second
Wednesday in December following their appointment. They meet at a place desig-
nated by each state's legislature. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1970). This problem arose in the 1960
election in which weeks passed before the victor in Hawaii was determined. See
PEIRCE, supra note 1, at 285.
85. For example, a three tier system could be adopted. First, a vote separation
between the leading candidates in excess of 0.2% of the total votes cast could be
considered conclusive. This is a margin 22% greater than the separation in the 1960
Kennedy-Nixon election. See note 24 supra. When the margin is between 0.1% and
0.2% the state's election official could be authorized to declare a winner if the vote
count appeared definitive, or to implement contingent election procedures if it ap-
peared unreliable or too close to call. The implementing legislation should enumerate
the criteria for the official to examine in making this decision, such as actual vote
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This analysis narrows the scope of the problem, but does not solve
it. There will still be elections that are so close that a winner cannot be
determined within the enumerated criteria. It is at this point that the
National Vote Plan fails to function: absent either a determination as
to the national winner, or a nationally enforceable recount mechanism
for making such a determination, a stalemate will result. In this event,
electors should be instructed to vote for the winner in their home
states. The existing electoral system would constitute the contingency
election mechanism under the National Vote Plan.
Although this solution is imperfect, it is preferable to the two other
available alternatives. Under the first, the appropriate state officer
could declare the winner of the Presidential election just as he would
for elections of state officials. However, it would be unwise to vest
such substantial power in a person who does not have the capacity to
accumulate the data necessary to make an appropriate decision, and it
would lead to the possibility of disparate results among states oper-
ating under the National Vote Plan. The possibility of arbitrary deci-
sions in such a circumstance counsels against this approach. Under
the second alternative, the leading candidate could be declared the
automatic winner according to a previously agreed upon vote totalling
method without the evaluation of a state official. This second alterna-
tive, however, avoids the issue of irregularities in the voting process
that affected the election results. Under the popular vote system, the
entire country would be analogous to a single state, and fraud any-
where could influence the outcome in a close election. By reverting to
the present system when an election is too close to call, vote fraud or
other irregularities could affect the outcome in one state, but would be
unlikely to have as great an impact on the country as a whole.
Although using the present system in an exceptionally close election
is the best alternative absent federal legislation, it poses a profound
question as to the worth of the National Vote Plan. It is only in a close
election that the current system can misfire and elect a popular-vote
loser, yet the National Vote Plan will revert to the current system in
separation, the apparent reliability of the vote count, and consensus of other state
election officers. A state's election official should not be given the authorization to de-
clare a winner in such circumstances because in such an election he could not obtain
sufficient accurate and unbiased information on the conduct of the election in the
other 49 states to more than guess at the winner. Finally, a separation of less than
0.1%, approximately 5/8 the Kennedy-Nixon margin in 1960, would be considered too
close to declare a winner, and contingent election provisions would be implemented.
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just such a close election. A number of factors mitigate this inconsis-
tency. First, the problem arises only if Congress does not enact na-
tional vote count legislation. If states adopt the National Vote Plan,
increased attention will be focused on the popular-vote winner, and
Congress may be spurred into action. Second, state legislation to de-
fine the requisite majority margin will minimize the problem of the
close election. Finally, candidates would conduct their campaigns on
the assumption that the Presidency will be gained through direct elec-
tion. Each popular vote would be recognized as carrying equal weight
and only secondarily would groups of voters receive special attention
because of their ability to affect a large bloc of electoral votes. Only
after election day would the voting disparities created by the existing
electoral college system be reintroduced. In short, although the Na-
tional Vote Plan cannot preclude the election of a minority-vote Presi-
dent absent federal vote count legislation, neither could any other
electoral plan. The National Vote Plan has two advantages in that it
can spur the passage of such a law, as well as provide for the election
of the people's candidate in all elections that produce a clear popular
winner.
III. CONCLUSIONS-THE EFFICACY OF THE
NATIONAL VOTE PLAN
The purposes of this discussion have been to suggest that the states
can initiate electoral reform independently of federal action, and to
demonstrate that the National Vote Plan can provide a viable mecha-
nism for electing the President. The merits of the proposal can best be
seen when they are compared to the advantages and disadvantages of
a constitutional amendment implemdnting a direct election plan.
The difficulties of the present electoral college would be eliminated
by passage of a constitutional amendment accompanied by national
ballot and national vote count legislation. To the extent that ballot
and vote count legislation were not implemented, similar problems
would exist under either the National Vote Plan or a constitutional
amendment. But even when balanced against tripartite federal reform,
the National Vote Plan compares favorably. Defecting electors would
pose only a theoretical problem because electoral majorities would
become larger, and the possibility that the outcome would be affected
by such defections would be correspondingly reduced. Moreover, le-
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gaily bound electors would effectively eliminate the possibility of
defection. The problem of a national ballot has, as a practical matter,
been solved by Williams v. Rhodes. Although judicial remedies to
guarantee ballot listing may be more burdensome than congressionally
prescribed procedures, Williams nonetheless suggests that serious na-
tional candidates cannot be excluded from state ballots. Finally, a na-
tional vote count accurate enough to determine the winner in all but
the closest elections already exists. In the event that the popular
winner cannot be ascertained in a close election, the National Vote
Plan would revert to the existing system, thus producing a victor with
a minimum of delay and uncertainty. Moreover, adoption of the Na-
tional Vote Plan by some states should encourage congressional enact-
ment of vote count legislation.
The National Vote Plan possesses advantages over the constitu-
tional amendment mechanism that may make it the superior alterna-
tive. The first advantage is pragmatic: the plan stands a much better
chance of success than an amendment. Numerous constitutional
amendment proposals languish in Congress, each with vocal adherents
but none with enough strength to obtain the requisite two-thirds ma-
jority of both Houses and subsequent ratification by three-fourths of
the states. On the other hand, the National Vote Plan can effectively
implement the direct election of the President if states with approxi-
mately 120 electoral votes enact it.
The second advantage is related to the first. Because the National
Vote Plan would not be a constitutional amendment, it could be re-
pealed by the enacting states if problems arose. Some critics object to
direct election because it constitutes a substantial departure from ex-
isting political institutions and practices, and may lead to a funda-
mental alteration in the distribution of political power-both between
the branches of federal government and the national political parties.
While some of these concerns seem illusory, the National Vote Plan
provides the flexibility to deal with unforeseen problems because it
could be repealed more readily than could a constitutional amend-
ment. In addition, the National Vote Plan does not abolish the elec-
toral college as would a constitutional amendment; it merely changes
its form. Repeal of the National Vote Plan would allow reversion to
the existing system.
On balance therefore, the National Vote Plan does not merely sug-
gest a viable proposal for electoral reform; it provides a superior one.
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Its substantive effect is essentially the same as a constitutional amend-
ment implementing the direct vote. Additionally, however, it provides
an effective and flexible method to shake loose from the constitutional
amendment impasse and bring about long overdue reform.
349
